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The State of Russian Economy and Finances in 
Selected Studies of the 1917 Revolution Period1
Obraz stanu gospodarki i finansów Rosji w wybranych pracach 
z okresu rewolucji lutowej 1917 r.
SUMMARY
The main purpose of this article was to present the state of the Russian economy and finance 
during World War I and in connection with the revolutionary events taking place in Russia in 1917. 
In this regard, a general analysis of widely unknown legal and economic works from 1917 by authors 
such as Z.S. Kacenelenbaum, I.A. Mikhailov, N.N. Lyubimov, G.D. Dementyev, D.P. Bogolepov, 
A.V. Venediktov, N.M. Yasny, P. Haensel, B.D. Bruckus, D.V. Kuzovkov, and A. Schreider was made. 
The works analyzed in the article are an example of the discussion of the Russian elites about the 
state’s problems in the context of the Legislative (Constitutional) Assembly that is to be assembled.
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INTRODUCTION
The fall of the Romanov dynasty and their rule at the turn of February and March 
1917 brought about huge socio-political and socio-economic changes in Russia. One 
of the signs of this new reality was the abolition of censorship coupled with striking 
development of various publishing houses. They started publishing thousands of 
articles, brochures, and leaflets, where they touched upon and evaluated the most 
1 Research work financed with budgetary allocations for 2014–2019 as a research project within 
the “Diamond Grant” programme. This article is an extended and modified version of the lecture 
delivered at the XXVII Polish National Convention for Historians of Law, System of Governance 
and Political-Legal Doctrine in Lublin in 10–12 September 2018.





important issues related to the country’s functioning and the future of its political 
and socio-economic system. One of the topics brought up for a heated discussion 
and for reflection by Russian lawyers, economists and politicians was the state of 
Russian economy and finances during World War I, as well as potential paths of 
change resulting from the February Revolution.
The purpose of this article is to conduct the general analysis of the largely 
unrecognised legal and economic studies from 1917, written by authors such as 
Z.S. Kacenelenbaum, I.A. Mikhailov, M.M. Lyubimov, G.D. Dementyev, D.P. Bo-
golepov, A. V. Venediktov, N.M. Yasny, P. Haensel, B.D. Bruckus, D.V. Kuzovkov, 
and A. Schreider. For a legal historian specialised in the history of Russian polit-
ical system during the Revolution, the importance lies in the fact that the studies 
analysed below were written during a short period of freedom and what is more, 
the authors’ research constitutes a first-hand account of people who participated 
in the events of the Revolution.
FINANCIAL COSTS OF THE GREAT WAR AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE 
FINANCIAL SITUATION OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE
Undoubtedly, the Revolution of 1917 in Russia was, to a great extent, the after-
math of the fact that the course of World War I was unfavourable to the Romanov 
family. Hence, the presence of written materials – both academic and journalistic 
ones – in the economy and law-related literature dating back to the February Rev-
olution of 19172. They described the Russian wartime economy and tried to point 
out the link between the course of the war and the causes of revolutionary events 
of early 1917. One of the most important study of that period dealing with the issue 
of Russia’s financial and economic situation during World War I, was the book by 
Z.S. Kacenelenbaum3 entitled The War and Russia’s Financial and Economic Sit-
uation4. In the introduction to the book, the author states that when the war broke 
out Russia was doing well, both on a financial and economic level5. Despite the fact 
that in many respects Russia was still “lagging behind” compared to the world’s 
2 Occurring from February to October 1917 (according to the Julian calendar, the so-called old 
style).
3 Zakharyi Salomonovich Kacenelenbaum (1885–1961) – Russian and Soviet lawyer, economist, 
and a state activist. In 1909 he graduated from the Faculty of Law at the Imperial Moscow University. 
Over the course of his professional academic career, he worked, among others, as a professor at the 
Department of Financial Science of the Faculty of Soviet Law/Structure of the Soviet System and 
Law at the Moscow University (1925–1931). In 1921–1929 he was a member of the Board of the 
State Bank of the USSR. He was persecuted in 1930–1933 and 1948.
4 Z.S. Kacenelenbaum, Voyna i finansovo-ekonomicheskoye polozheniye Rossii, Moskva 1917.
5 Ibidem, p. 1.
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major powers, the process of expanding individual property in villages continued, 
the demand for agricultural machines on the farms increased6, and there was also 
an increase in the export of Russian agricultural products, in coal extraction and in 
metal production. Moreover, the cooperative movement was in bloom. As it was 
noticed by the author of the book: “Lagging behind the West, we were still mov-
ing forward by making big steps”7. However, when evaluating Russia’s finances 
and pre-revolution budget in terms of imposing public law liabilities, Kacenelen-
baum pointed out that in capitalist countries those liabilities are disadvantageous 
to “the working elements of the country”8. According to him, in times of peace, 
the main burden of tax liabilities is imposed on the lower and middle classes9. 
Kacenelenbaum perceived it as a significant correlation, as the acts of war were 
mostly financed with taxes and loans taken by the government, yet the interests on 
the loans (as well as the loans themselves) were then going to be paid back by the 
government to the affluent lenders (in the original source “to the capitalists”). The 
money, on the other hand, would be taken from taxes paid by the general public10. 
Consequently, according to Kacenelenbaum’s assessment, war-related expenses 
lower the budget and the wealth of the country, and if a war is financed with the 
loans, the expenses are then covered by the “future generations of tax-payers”11.
According to the statistics presented by Kacenelenbaum, Russia’s war-related 
expenses until 1 September 1917 (therefore, over a period of three years and one 
and a half months) equalled nearly 40 billion roubles, which was allegedly 12 times 
as much as total budget expenses of 191312. As reported in his calculations, in 1914, 
war-related costs borne by Russia equalled 9–10 million roubles per day and by 
June 1917, they rose up to 60 million roubles per day13. In 1917 Kacenelenbaum 
speculated that after the end of the war and the Revolution, Russia would be left 
with a national debt of about 65–70 billion roubles, and the interests alone would 
amount to around 3 billion roubles per year14. Then he concluded that the country’s 
first finance-related task should be to generate the funds to pay off the interests, the 
second step would be to pay back short-term liabilities, and the third one would be 
the general recovery of the monetary system15.
6 Z.S. Kacenelenbaum referred to Ministry of Finance Journal of 1915 and to Collection of 
Economic and Statistical Information Regarding Agricultural Economy stated that in 1911 in 50 
governorates of Russia the production of agricultural machines amounted to 45 693 000 roubles.
7 Z.S. Kacenelenbaum, op. cit., p. 5.
8 Ibidem, p. 8.
9 Ibidem, p. 25.
10 Ibidem, pp. 22–25.
11 Ibidem, p. 25.
12 Ibidem, p. 18.
13 Ibidem, p. 19.
14 Ibidem, p. 59.
15 Ibidem.





Another important study of the Russian economy during World War I was a book 
published in Saint Petersburg in 1917, entitled Russia’s State Income and Expenses 
during World War I: Facts and Figures16 written by I.A. Mikhailov17. When describing 
Russia’s financial situation of 1914, the author noticed that the war, which at that point 
had already started, caused a huge increase of state expenses and to difficulties of the 
tax system. It constituted an additional complication, as the new policy was introduced 
at the turn of 1913 and 1914, namely the one aiming at reducing the distribution and 
the general consumption of alcohol18. Those restrictions or even prohibitions (which 
started as soon as the mobilization was announced) of selling various types of alcohol 
products led to huge financial difficulties. Until the outbreak of the war in 191419, 
the state income was, to a great extent, dependent on the charges related to alcohol 
sales20. When describing the difficulties of Russia’s state budget in 1915, Mikhailov 
started the analysis by pointing, among others, to the fact of losing control of the 
industrialised territory of the Kingdom of Poland and the Kholm Governorate, which 
consequently meant losing the income thereof21. Mikhailov stated that, by buying large 
quantities of goods and services during the war (mostly on credit), the government 
paid for it with the money of the present and future generations22.
The war expenses were also calculated by N.N. Lyubimov23 in his study entitled 
How Does the State Collect People’s Money and What Is It Spent On?24 He calculated 
that before 1914, the general income of tsarist Russia’s population equalled 15 bil-
lion roubles, out of which 3 billion was the national budget income25. The estimated 
16 I.A. Mikhailov, Gosudarstvennyye dokhody i raskhody Rossii vo vremya voyny (Fakty i tsifry), 
Petrograd 1917. This publication was written in the autumn of 1916 and then published as a part of 
the series “War and the Economic Life”, published under the general editorship of Professor Peter 
Berngardovich Struve (1870–1944).
17 Ivan Adrianovich Mikhailov (1891–1946) – Russian economist, lawyer, political activist. One of 
the most famous activists of the so-called white movement in Russia, an active member of the Russian 
Provisional Government, the Minister of Finance in the Russian Government of the admiral A.V. Kolchak.
18 I.A. Mikhailov, op. cit., pp. 12–14.
19 Е.S. Kravtsova, Problemy reformirovaniya nalogovoy sistemy Rossiyskoy imperii v gody Pervoy 
mirovoy voyny (po vospominaniyam P.L. Barka), „Ekonomicheskaya istoriya” 2017, № 4, pp. 41–43.
20 I.A. Mikhailov, op. cit., pp. 16–17.
21 Ibidem, p. 73. Referring to the statistics of the State Audit of 1913, Mikhailov noticed that 
the income coming to the Russian Empire’s budget from the Congress Poland (without the so-called 
“vinnoj operation”) amounted to nearly 198.5 million roubles.
22 Ibidem, p. 164.
23 Nikolai Nikolaievich Lyubimov (1894–1977) – Russian and Soviet lawyer, lecturer and 
economist. In 1917 he graduated from the Faculty of Law at Moscow University. In 1919–1921 he 
worked as a lecturer at the Moscow Institute of Economics and Finance. Then he worked for many 
years at the People’s Commissariat for Finance and the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade.
24 N.N. Lyubimov, Kak gosudarstvo sobirayet narodnyye den’gi i na chto ono raskhoduyet ikh?, 
Moskva 1917.
25 Ibidem, pp. 7–8.
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cost of war-related expenses in 1914–1917 amounted to 38 billion and 400 million 
roubles26 and a state debt for 1 January 1918 was estimated at 55 billion roubles27. 
According to Lyubimov’s assessment, huge war expenses and interests on the loans 
should mostly be covered by imposing and increasing direct taxes, especially on the 
moneyed classes28. Therefore, Lyubimov criticised the complex fiscal system of his 
country, which was mostly based on indirect taxes.
Another book touching upon the issue in question was written by G.D. Demen-
tyev29 and it is entitled Russia’s State Income and Expenses and the Situation of 
the State Treasury During the War with Germany and Austria-Hungary Until Late 
191730. In the introduction to this study, Dementyev wrote that in the present-day 
armed conflicts there are three decisive factors: well-armed forces maintaining high 
levels of morale, well-organised resources, and money31. The author stated that if, 
during the war, country’s financial system is undergoing a crisis, then it contributes 
to the disorganisation of the resources and, consequently, of the army and then the 
country is bound to be defeated32. Dementyev noticed that if a minor war against 
Japan33 had such a big impact on the Russian economy and finances, then being at 
war with countries as powerful as Germany and Austria-Hungary would greatly affect 
the Russian budget. The author noticed that the war-related expenses significantly 
increased in 1917, as a consequence of the Revolution. The most significant increase 
could be noticed in the expenses of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, responsible for 
providing help to soldiers’ families, and the Ministry of Roads and Transportation34.
On the other hand, D.P. Bogolepov35 in his work entitled War and Finance36 
pointed out that in the conditions of 1917, the task of determining the cost of the 
26 Ibidem, p. 9.
27 Ibidem, p. 10.
28 Ibidem, p. 15.
29 Gavril Dmitriyevich Dementyev – Russian official at the Ministry for Finance in the Russian 
Empire and in the Provisional Government. The Head of the Accounting Section of the Treasury 
Department at the Ministry for Finance.
30 G.D. Dementyev, Gosudarstvennyye dokhody i raskhody Rossii i polozheniye gosudarstven-
nogo kaznacheystva za vremya voyny s Germaniyey i Avstro-Vengriyey do kontsa 1917 g., Petrograd 
1917. The book was published by the Ministry for Finance.
31 Ibidem, p. 2.
32 Ibidem. Dementyev meant that Russians, as opposed to Germans, did not have “a talent for 
organisational planning”, which could easily lead to disorganisation of the resources.
33 The author described that war, from a military perspective, as an “unimportant war episode”.
34 G.D. Dementyev, op. cit., p. 62.
35 Dmitry Petrovich Bogolepov (1885–1941) – Russian and Soviet economist, academic lecturer, 
expert supporting the Bolshevik party. In 1909 he graduated from the Law Department of the Moscow 
State University. Specialist in the field of financial law, finance and banking. The main contractor of 
the Bolshevik reform of universities in the 1920s.
36 D.P. Bogolepov, Voyna i finansy, Moskva 1917.





war was difficult, because a significant part of it was covered by military secrets37. 
In addition, these costs were difficult to determine due to the destruction of many 
spheres of the functioning of society and the state, including due to huge popu-
lation losses38.
An important book published during the Revolution of 1917 and describing 
how the war affected the Russian economy was The War, Rising Prices and Old 
Contracts39 by A.V. Venediktov40. In this study, the author drew attention to eco-
nomic and legal problems related to the issues in question, namely the fact that 
according to the legislation of 1914, companies whose activity was related to 
manufacturing for defence purposes or to fuel industry and supplies were obliged 
to give priority to state contracts over the previously-concluded ones (mostly pri-
vate, but also state ones)41. As a result, many companies did not manage to execute 
a great deal of previously-concluded contracts. It is true that the legislation of 1914 
relieved those companies from the responsibility for the breach of the deadline, 
however, it did not mention the possibility to dissolve the contracts42. The impor-
tance of those issues lay in the fact that the prices of resources and production costs 
kept rising, which led to companies introducing a policy of increasing the prices 
of the compulsory state commissions, in order to compensate for the losses of the 
previously-concluded and non-executed (or executed with a delay) contracts43. Ven-
ediktov stated that such practices were unbeneficial to the interests of the consumer 
policy44. Moreover, war expenses in Russia also kept rising. Some establishments, 
involved in coal trading, i.e. Saint Petersburg’s companies P. Bekkel (in Russian: 
Павел Бекель) and the Shopping Centre Andrey Ellers, refused to execute the 
contracts concluded before 1914, by referring to the circumstances of war (i.e. 
requisition) and hence to force majeure45. The topic of executing civil and public 
37 Ibidem, p. 5.
38 Ibidem.
39 А.V. Venediktov, Voyna, rost tsen i staryye kontrakty, Vyp. 2: Ocherednyye voprosy finansovoy 
i ekonomicheskoy politiki, Petrograd 1917.
40 Anatoly Vasilievich Venediktov (1887–1959) – Russian and Soviet lawyer, economist, aca-
demic researcher, Bolshevik activist. In 1949 his book entitled The State Socialist Ownership received 
the State Stalin Prize. He served as a dean and the Head of the Civil Law Department at Leningrad 
State University.
41 Ibidem, p. 6.
42 Ibidem, pp. 6–7.
43 Ibidem, p. 8.
44 Ibidem.
45 Ibidem, p. 11. However, in March 1916, the Commercial Court of Saint Petersburg declared 
that referring to force majeure was, in that case, unjustified, as coal was present on the market and 
the increase of its price does not constitute a valid reason for non-execution of contract.
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(commercial) obligations during the war was also discussed by Y.A. Kantorovich46 
in 1917 in his well-known study War and the Execution of Obligations47.
THE ISSUE OF FOOD SUPPLY
Legal and economic sources dating back to the period of 1917 Revolution 
contain a lot of information concerning food supplies during World War I. In this 
respect, the important studies include The Supply Crisis and Monopoly on Bread48 
and The Practice of Controlling Bread Supplies49 written by a lawyer N.M. Yas-
ny50. In the first study, the author wrote that in autumn of 1914, the prices of bread 
were still stable and even low51, but because of the poorly developed transportation 
network, bread became less and less accessible in the central districts of Russia52. 
For this reason, on 17 February 1915, the commandants of military districts were 
given the right to:
− establish prices of bread and forage bought for the army,
− confiscate bread and forage from people who were unwilling to sell it vol-
untarily and lower their prices by 15%,
− prohibit the transport of bread and forage from one district to another53.
According to Yasny, the regulations that allowed the establishment of different 
prices resulted in the phenomenon of rapidly increasing costs, which started as 
early as the beginning of 1915. Despite quite prolific years, especially 1915, due 
to transportation problems and the major mobilization (hence lack of workforce in 
villages)54, the state was forced to use their own provisions in order to provide bread 
46 Yakov Abramovich Kantorovich (1859–1925) – Russian lawyer, a barrister. He graduated 
from the Faculty of Law at Saint Petersburg University. He wrote numerous articles related to the 
copyright issues. He was an editor of the magazines, such as “Judicial Review”, “Senate Activity 
Review”, and “Legislative Review”.
47 Y.A. Kantorovich, Voyna i ispolneniye obyazatel’stv, Petrograd 1917.
48 N.М. Yasny, Prodovol’stvennyy krizis i khlebnaya monopoliya, Petrograd 1917.
49 Idem, Opyt regulirovki snabzheniya khlebom, Petrograd 1917.
50 Naum Mikhailovicz Yasny (1883–1967) – graduated from the Faculty of Law at Kharkov 
University. In 1908–1909 he worked as a lawyer in Saint Petersburg. In 1920 he worked in the Min-
istry of Supply in Georgia. From 1933, he worked in the U.S. as an expert on USSR’s agriculture.
51 On the so-called export territories of the Empire – such as Novorossiya or the South Caucasus 
– as the war with Turkey broke out, the prices of bread must have been low, as the export of grains 
decreased eight times.
52 N.М. Yasny, Prodovol’stvennyy…, pp. 1–2.
53 Ibidem.
54 See 1917 god v sel’skokhozyaystvennom otnoshenii po otvetam, poluchennym ot khozyayev, 
Vyp. 4: Sostoyaniye khlebov i trav k 10-mu iyunya. Podennaya plata za trud v period vesennikh po-
sevov, Petrograd 1917 p. IX. According to the information brochure of the Department of Agricultural 
Economy Agricultural Statistics at the Ministry of Land of the Provisional Government, according 





to workers working in defence services and, later on, all the people in need55. In his 
studies, Yasny included detailed descriptions of how Russia, initially a country with 
stable prices of grain and bread, turned into a country with huge supply problems 
(because of the war and poor organisation).
THE ISSUE OF THE LAND REFORM
One of the main issues regarding the reforms and socio-economic system in 
Russia was the land reform. It is worth mentioning that, in the environment of 
1917, Russia’s Financial Reform56 by Professor Paul Haensel57 was published. To 
his way of thinking, when it comes to the issue of land and the division of land 
from the so-called “new land fund”, the “mistake of 1861 regulation” should not 
be repeated and “the land should simply be given to peasants”58. Regarding the 
system of land division, the author claimed that the only fair way of dealing with 
it would be distributing the land according to “a sort of degree of participation in 
the world war”59. The first category would include people who stood out during 
battles, suffered injuries and wounds during the war and people whose family 
members died or went missing at war. The second category would be made up of 
“all the remaining participants of the war or the acts of war” (excluding those sen-
tenced for desertion). The third category would then encompass all the remaining 
peasants who “did not break their bond with the land”. A person would be granted 
the ownership of the land provided that they continuously work on it for five years 
after receiving the ownership (with the possibility of passing it on as heritage). If, 
on the other hand, a peasant lost their bond with the land (i.e. by attempting to sell 
it or by not working on it), the land was then supposed to be taken over by the so-
-called “volosti fund” in order to be passed on to other peasants.
Another study raising the issue of the state of Russian agriculture during World 
War I and the Revolution was In the Context of the Present State of the Agriculture 
to the situation in June 1917, the lack of workforce was the most noticeable at gentry farms, mostly 
because of the rising wages for workers. Therefore, the area of the cultivated land became smaller.
55 N.М. Yasny, Prodovol’stvennyy…, p. 3.
56 P. Haensel, Finansovaya reforma v Rossii, Vyp. 3, Petrograd 1917.
57 Paul Haensel (Russian: Павел Петрович Гензель, Paviel Pietrovicz Genzel, 1878–1949) – 
Russian and American financier. He came from an evangelical merchant family. In 1987 he graduated 
from the Moscow Academy of Commerce and the Faculty of Law of the Moscow University in 1902. 
A professor at the Moscow University in the Department of Financial Law. In 1928 he left the Soviet 
Union and went to the University of Graz in Austria as a visiting professor and applied to stay there. 
He continued his academic career in the United States.
58 P. Haensel, op. cit., p. 108.
59 Ibidem, p. 109.
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by B.D. Bruckus60, published in 1917 in Saint Petersburg by the Free Economic 
Society, as the first publication of “Russia’s Agricultural Issues” series61. The au-
thor claimed that the imminent land reform would potentially be one of the most 
significant events in the history of Russian development and, therefore, the issue 
should be dealt with independently of the political battle and populism62. Bruckus 
wrote that unlimited expropriation without compensation would be an inappropriate 
way of carrying out a land reform, as it is against the ownership rights and also the 
interests of capital, as the majority of lands were mortgaged. Such a solution would 
lead to a situation, in which the capital from the West, necessary for the country’s 
post-war development, would never get to Russia63. The most appropriate way of 
boosting Russian agriculture would be to reinforce peasant farms by increasing their 
productivity, while taking advantage of the capital and the technological advances, 
rather than by only increasing the land bank. On the flip side, Bruckus criticised the 
concepts of maintaining communities or creating new forms of collective ownership 
in villages based on local government or state government ownership. However, 
the division of land itself, should not be based on the unlimited rule of equal land 
division among peasants. It should take into consideration local conditions, needs 
and the potential for growth of large-scale and peasant farms.
THE CHANGE OF THE TAX SYSTEM IN RUSSIA
Another issue raised in the discussion about changes in the Russian socio-eco-
nomic system during the February Revolution of 1917, was the tax system and tax 
rates as such. One of the most interesting publications on the subject was a study 
written by a scholar D.V. Kuzovkov64 entitled What Types of Taxes Should Be Estab-
lished by the Legislative/Constitutional Assembly?, published in 1917 by a socialist 
60 Ber Davidovich Bruckus (1874–1938) – Russian economist, statistician, agronomist and 
social activist. In 1898 he graduated from the Institute of Agriculture and Forestry in Puławy. Free 
market supporter, one of the main agrarian experts of Tsarist Russia supporting the agrarian reform of 
P. Stolypin. After leaving Bolshevik Russia in 1922, he lived and worked in Lithuania, Germany and 
France. In 1935 he emigrated to Palestine. Brother of Jewish activist and politician Judel Davidovicz 
Bruckus (1870–1951).
61 B.D. Bruckus, K sovremennomu polozheniyu agrarnogo voprosa, Petrograd 1917. Bruckus’ 
study was actually a publication of a lecture delivered on 6 April 1917 during the session of the Free 
Economic Society. During that session, Saint Petersburg Department of the Society appointed the League 
for Agrarian Reforms, which was supposed to give support and special expertise to the land reform.
62 Ibidem, pp. 3–5.
63 Ibidem, p. 15.
64 Dmitry Vasilievich Kuzovkov (1885–1961) – he graduated from gymnasium in Orle, then 
from the Faculty of Law at Moscow University. He was one of the founders and employees of the 
so-called Communist Academy.





publishing house “Sprava”65. This canvassing publication included postulates regard-
ing Russia’s future tax system, which was supposed to be adopted by the imminent 
Constitutional Assembly66. The first postulate was the prohibition of imposing taxes 
on people whose income is insufficient to provide for themselves67. According to 
Kuzovkov, this group of people should be relieved from tax liabilities. The second 
postulate was the necessity to introduce a progressive system of calculating taxes, 
which means higher taxes for people with higher income68. The author considered 
the progressive tax system as the only appropriate solution for a democratic repub-
lic. The third postulate was related to the tax reliefs for people providing for their 
multi-child families69. The following part of the study is related to criticism and 
to postulates of the abolishment of the indirect taxes (excluding taxes on luxury 
goods), which would allegedly lead to the exploitation of working classes, economic 
stratification of the society and wars70. Therefore, direct taxes (income tax, wealth 
tax, inheritance tax and the tax on unjust enrichment) were supposed to constitute 
the basis of the tax system71. In Kuzovkov’s opinion, if a country only used indirect 
taxes, the war expenses would also be covered by moneyed classes. In consequence, 
it would imply a lower aggressiveness of some countries, as the bourgeoisie would 
try to avoid jeopardising their wealth72. At the end of his brochure, Kuzovkov in-
dicated that apart from slogans such as “an eight-hour working day” or “land for 
the peasants”, the working masses should emphasise the postulates related to tax 
abolishment and introducing exclusively direct progressive taxes73.
Another example of canvassing-propaganda brochures of 1917 regarding eco-
nomic and tax-related issues, was a publication by A. Schreider entitled About 
Taxes, published by the Socialist Revolutionary Party74. The leading theme of the 
publication was a criticism of the Russian tax system of that period. Schreider dis-
tinguished between direct and hidden (indirect) taxes75 and argued that the latter are 
the most unfair to the people. In the study, he calculated that the Treasury of Russia 
65 D.V. Kuzovkov, Kakiye nalogi dolzhno ustanovit’ Uchreditel’noye sobraniye?, Moskva 1917.
66 М.V. Lushnikova, A.M. Lushnikov, Rossiyskaya shkola finansovogo prava: portrety na fone 
vremeni, Yaroslavl 2013, pp. 211–212.
67 D.V. Kuzovkov, op. cit., p. 8.
68 Ibidem, p. 10.
69 Ibidem, p. 11.
70 Ibidem, p. 15.
71 Ibidem, p. 30.
72 Ibidem, p. 18. Kuzovkov points out that the “completely unnecessary war” between Russia 
and Japan in 1904–1905 was an expense for Russian citizens that amounted to around 3.5 billion 
roubles. Bearing that in mind, he claims that if the bourgeoisie and the gentry had had to cover the 
costs, they wouldn’t have supported the Tsar in that war.
73 Ibidem, p. 31.
74 А. Schreider, O nalogakh, Petrograd 1917.
75 Ibidem, p. 3.
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was supposed to receive 3 billion roubles in 1917, which would be 19 roubles from 
each citizen (including men, women, the elderly and the youth)76. However, only 
400 million roubles allegedly came from indirect taxes77. In order to point out the 
unfairness of the tax system, Schreider presented an example of a peasant family, 
made up of six people. According to him, such a family should be able to earn 350 
roubles per year (half of it in cash and half of it in agri-food products), however, 
given that each person has to pay 19 roubles of tax to the state budget, the total of 
their public-law liabilities will rise up to 114 roubles (15 roubles of direct taxes and 
99 roubles of indirect taxes)78. Because of those inequalities and exploitation, the 
system needs to be changed into a socialist one, which can be achieved by means of 
a revolution. Yet the socialist revolution was, according to Schreider, a thing of the 
future and it required getting prepared for the whole new “economic and social life”79. 
When describing the future tax system, Schreider stated that taxes are the means 
that allow to address common needs, therefore, they should be common and even.
CONCLUSION
The studies presented above prove that the scholars working on issues re- 
lated to the Russian economy and financial system in the environment of the 1917 
Revolution presented an accurate analysis of the situation. The studies related to 
the Russian economic system published during the Revolution of February 1917 
mostly dealt with the issue of expenses that the war imposes on the society, on the 
economy and on the state. When the outbreak of the 1917 Revolution brought about 
the abolition of censorship, it made space for a free discussion about the actual 
condition of the Russian economy. The studies analysed in the present article also 
shed light on the opinions of the Russian elite regarding their country’s issues in 
the context of the imminent Legislative (Constitutional) Assembly.
Another conclusion that comes to mind after the analysis of the above-men-
tioned studies is a dramatic increase of war-related costs. Russian lawyers and 
economists were able to accurately and unanimously assess the costs of the acts of 
war and the cause of their massive increase, however, they did not elaborate on the 
preparation of appropriate solutions to the problems. Those solutions were mostly 
suggested by the scholars who sided with ideals of the socialists and the Bolsheviks, 
i.e. D.V. Kuzovkov, who suggested the change of the tax system in terms of elim-
inating indirect taxes and increasing the taxes for the so-called moneyed classes.
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The analysed studies also reflect that the Russian economic and financial sys-
tem was not prepared for a war on such a huge scale and the resources became 
less available and the prices started rising because of the backward social structure 
(mostly due to the lack of land reform) and infrastructure. Consequently, as the war 
expenses rose, the social discontent increased and the authorities, both the tsarist and 
the revolutionary ones, seemed to find it difficult, if not impossible, to deal with it.
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STRESZCZENIE
Celem niniejszego artykułu było zaprezentowanie stanu rosyjskiej gospodarki i finansów w okre-
sie I wojny światowej oraz w związku z wydarzeniami rewolucyjnymi w Rosji w 1917 r. W tym 
zakresie dokonano ogólnej analizy nieznanych szerzej prawno-ekonomicznych prac z 1917 r. takich 
autorów, jak Z.S. Kacenelenbaum, I.A. Michajłow, M.M. Ljubimow, G.D. Dementjew, D.P. Bogo-
lepow, A.W. Wenediktow, N.M. Jasnyj, P. Haensel, B.D. Bruckus, D.W. Kuzowkow i A. Szrejder. 
Analizowane w artykule prace stanowią przykład dyskusji rosyjskich elit o problemach państwa 
w kontekście mającego się zebrać Zgromadzenia Ustawodawczego (Konstytucyjnego).
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